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Abstract
Is a bank that provides cross-border services into aforeign country without being physically present in such
country required to comply with such countrys banking laws? Domestic legislatures in many countries
have not addressed this issue, and the competentjudicial and administrative authorities tend to rule on a
case-by-case basis applying approaches that not only lack consistency and predictability, but also appear to
be unfounded if not arbitrary. This article attempts to analyze the problem in accordance with nationally
and internationally acknowledged principles of legal methodology. It combines the interpretive guideline
drawn from the purposes of banking regulation with the implications of the territoriality principle.
Thereby, it develops a staggered solution that is flexible enough to embrace the relevant circumstances of
the case at issue and clear enough to provide for a high level of legal predictability.
I. Introduction-Description and Demarcation
of the Problem
Domestic markets are growing together in a globalized world. Accordingly, the number of
business activities that involve connections to more than one country is increasing rapidly.
A. IN-COUNTRY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
A large part of this international business is done through the physical presence of
companies in foreign countries. In particular, companies serve foreign customers through
subsidiaries, branches, agencies, representative offices, and temporary visits from company
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representatives to the foreign countryI Those entities or units are clearly engaged in busi-
ness activities in the foreign country, and hence have to comply-principally-with for-
eign administrative (regulatory) law.
In the business of banking, for instance, a company that is incorporated in country
A and has its principal place of business in country A (the home country), but that is also
engaged in the business of banking in country B through a branch or a representative
office in country B, must observe the banking statutes and regulations of country B (which
hosts the physical presence and, hence, is called the host country). If country B requires
a banking license for the conduct of banking business in its territory, then, in the absence
of special legislation that exempts foreign companies under certain circumstances,2 the
aforementioned company has to apply and qualify for such banking license under country
B's banking laws.
This compliance requirement is basically undisputed and follows from the territoriality
principle:' Everyone who is physically present in the territory of a given country must, as a
general rule, at least comply with the laws of that country.4 However, companies and their
business activities, particularly in the banking industry, are very likely already regulated
by their home country and in several cases a double regulation (by both the home and the
host country) appears to be neither efficient nor necessary5 Thus, countries have made
considerable efforts to enter into international or supranational agreements which attempt
to avoid, or at least alleviate, the negative consequences of multiple, differing regulations
of internationally acting banking institutions. This has been accomplished by mutual
recognition of home country oversight (e.g., by passporting the home country's banking
license to other countries, particularly in the European Economic Area (EEA)),6 through
international harmonization of substantive regulatory law (as has been attempted regarding
the minimum capital requirements through the Basel Accords),7 or by combining these
approaches.8
B. CROSs-BORDER BUSINESS
While in the past most international business was conducted through on-site physical
presence in the host country, international business activities increasingly are conducted
without any physical presence abroad. In these cases it is not the company that crosses
2. Compare, in particular, the single license doctrine in the EU/EEA; see infra Part II and note 6.
3. See infra Part V.D. (providing a detailed discussion of the territoriality principle).
4. See Mathias Hanten, Auficbesrecbtiche Erlaubnispflicbt bei grenziiberscbreitenden Bankgescbiften and Finan-
zdienstkistungen [The Regulatory License Requirement for Cross-Border Banking Activities and Financial Services],
2003 WM 1412, 1413 (ER.G.).
5. See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo. L.J. 883 (2002) (discussing the problem
of overregulation in cases of home country and host country oversight).
6. See the Second Banking Directive 2000/12/EC, March 20, 2000, as amended. See Scott, supra note 1,
at 120-27; Christoph Ohler, Aufrichtsrechtlicbe Fragen des ekctronic banking [Supervisory Law Issues of Electronic
Bankingl, 2002 VVM 162, 163-64 (F.R.G.); Hanten, mpra note 4, at 1415; Alexander Schopper & Andreas
Zahradnik, Privat- und aufsichttrecbliche Aspekte grenziiberscbreitender Bankgescbafte im Internet [Issues of Private
and Regulatory Law on Cross-Border Banking Activities in the Internet], 2003 OBA 21, 27 (Austria).
7. See ScoTT, supra note 1, at 191-214.
8. Compare, for example, the U.S.-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue with regard to accounting
standards; see HAL S. ScoTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE-TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 72-73,98-109
(13th ed. 2006) (discussing the Regulatory Dialogue in general and the internationalization of accounting
standards).
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the border (through the establishment of a branch or office), but the service itself.
Therefore, this form of international business conduct is referred to here as cross-border
business. This is in contrast to the in-country international business operated through
on-site physical presence. Since, in cases of cross-border business transactions, the for-
eign country that receives the cross-border services does not host any physical presence
of the company, it shall be referred to as the non-home country or recipient country to
distinguish it semantically from the host country in cases of in-country international
business.
The rapid surge of cross-border banking business has been supported by the improve-
ment of modern telecommunication systems, particularly the Internet, as well as by the
increasing importance and popularity of structured financial products that, mostly for tax
reasons, entail the set-up of a foreign legal entity that is supposed to perform certain
cross-border banking services. A typical example of such cross-border business would be
a U.S. bank offering its depository services via the Internet or telephone to Austrian cus-
tomers, without ever being physically present in Austria. The Austrian customer makes
her deposits to and withdrawals from her account with the U.S. bank by placing respective
orders via the Internet-without ever physically entering the United States. The orders
are executed between the U.S. bank and the customer's Austrian main bank by means of
wire transfer. Is the U.S. bank engaged in the business of banking in Austria and hence
subject to Austrian banking law?
Put more generally: Is an entity that is engaging in the business of banking in connec-
tion with a foreign country, but without being physically present in that foreign country,
subject to the foreign country's banking laws? This is the critical question addressed by
this article.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE
This article appears to be the first attempt to elaborate a solution to the problem
surrounding the international applicability of domestic banking laws that is, instead of
being driven by the desire to reach a certain outcome favorable to the domestic, com-
mercial, or personal interests of the respective interpreter, entirely based on and analyzed
in accordance with domestically and internationally acknowledged principles of legal
methodology. It is structured as follows: Part II explores how and to what extent legisla-
tures address cross-border issues, particularly in the field of banking law. Part Inl briefly
describes how the competent authorities in selected jurisdictions deal with cross-border
banking activities. Part V, the main section of this article, provides a teleological anal-
ysis that offers-in the absence of explicit legislation on the international applicability
of domestic banking laws-solutions to the question of whether a cross-border banking
activity is covered by the extraterritorial reach of the recipient country's banking laws.
Finally, Part V summarizes the main findings of the article.
H. Legislative Approaches to the International
Applicability of Domestic Law
Complicated legal questions regarding the applicability of domestic law in international
cases; i.e., in cases that have connections to more than one country, are not peculiar to
administrative law. They also appear in the fields of private law and criminal law. The legal
issues in those areas have early attracted considerable attention from legislatures. Since
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the enactment of the first conflict-of-law rules in Ancient Egypt,9 nearly every developed
country has enacted, in one form or another, a detailed set of international private law'5
provisions which explicitly tell the courts what national private law governs a case that has
connections to more than one country." Likewise, most countries have adopted explicit
rules in their criminal codes that govern domestic law applicability issues arising in connec-
tion with international criminal cases.
By contrast, clear statutory or regulatory provisions are rare in the field of international
administrative law. Only in isolated areas, such as tax law, securities law, 2 or antitrust law,
have some countries adopted provisions that focus on very special conflict-of-law situ-
ations. Often these provisions are strongly influenced by the lobbying efforts of certain
domestic interest groups, which makes the enacted rules seem more like the result of
a mere outcome-driven endeavor than of a thoroughly balanced application of general
legal principles. Most areas of administrative law, however, do not provide for an explic-
it regulation of the international applicability of such laws to cross-border cases. This
is particularly true for the regulation of banking services. The banking laws in Austria,
Germany, the United States, and many other countries do not tackle crucial cross-border
issues at all. While those laws contain some provisions that regulate the physical presence
of a foreign bank through subsidiaries, branches, agencies, and representative offices 3 (the
in-country international business), there is no provision in the examined laws that would
address cross-border issues and name the conditions and circumstances under which a
cross-border banking service is considered to fall within the scope of application of the
domestic banking laws. Sections 9-17 of the Austrian Banking Act (BWG) and Section 53b
of the German Banking Act (KWG), the provisions that come closest to touching upon
cross-border issues, more or less merely extend the privileges granted to foreign EEA
9. See Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 300 (1953).
10. In accordance with the traditional European linguistic usage, the term "international private law" refers
to national (domestic) law that determines which out of two or more involved national private laws shall apply to
a given international case (a case with connections to more than one country). Likewise, the term international
"administrative law" refers to national law that determines the international applicability of national adminis-
trative law. The same applies mutatis mutandis to the term "international criminal law".
11. See, e.g., Bundesgesetz fiber das internationale Privatrecbt [A-IPRGI [International Private Law Act]
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 304/1978, as amended, (Austria); Bundesgesetz fiber das Internationale Privatrecht
[S-IPRG] [Swiss International Private Law Act] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, as amended, (Switz.).
12. SeeJAMEs D. Cox, et al., SECURITIES REGULATION 217 etseq., 250-52 (4th ed. 2004); ANDREAS ZA HRADNIK,
FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGEN UND WERTPAPIERAUFSICHT [FINANcIAL SERVICES AND SECURITIES SUPERVISION] 40-45
(1997); ScoTr, supra note 1, at 58-66; see Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.ER. 230.901-905; see Thomas Pfeifer,
Zum internationalen Anwendungsbereich des deutscben Kapitalmarktrechts [On the International Applicability of the
German Capital Market Law], 2003 IPRax 233 (F.R.G.) (discussing German law); see GEORG FROLICHSTAL,
CHRISTIAN HAUSMANINGER, PETER KNOBL, MARTIN OPPITZ & WALTRAUD ZEIPELT, KOMMENTAR ZUM WERTPA-
PIERAUFSICHTSGESETZ [COMMENTARY ON THE AUSTRIAN SECURITIES SUPERVISION ACT] (1998) § 1I para. 30-3 5
(discussing Austrian law).
13. In Austria, the Bankwesengesetz [BWG] [Austrian BankingAct], Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 532/1993,
as amended, (Austria), regulates the requirements to be complied with by foreign financial institutions that are
licensed in another country of the EEA and intend to establish a physical presence in Austria in §§ 9, 9a, 11
(branches), and 13 (subsidiaries) (in connection with §§15-17), and it touches upon the license requirement for
Austrian branches of foreign Non-EEA banks in § 4(4). It imposes obligations on Austrian banks that intend
to establish a branch in another EEA country in § 10. In Germany, the Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen [KWGI
[German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI.] I at 2776, as amended, (F.R.G.), addresses
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banks with domestic branches to foreign EEA banks that wish to make use of the freedom
to provide cross-border services.'
4
Those provisions, however, do not give any information about the legislature's position
on the crucial question of what constitutes a cross-border banking service that reaches so
far into the recipient country that the application of the recipient country's banking laws
is, in the view of its legislature, desirable. The consequence of such determination is that
a foreign bank must comply with such laws or, within the EEA, must look for a protection
granted by the mentioned EEA privileges. Put another way, how weak and remote do the
connections of such cross-border service to the recipient country have to be in order that
such service is not covered by the reach of the recipient country's banking laws?
To illustrate the query, no country would seriously claim to be competent to supervise a
loan granted from a foreign bank to a foreign borrower only because the borrower intends
to spend the borrowed money on a vacation in such country (the non-home country).
Although there is a certain connection to the non-home country, this link is obviously too
weak to consider the granting of the loan as a cross-border banking activity that would
justify regulatory oversight by the non-home country.
But what applies in the not-so-obvious cross-border cases? The legislatures have not
answered this question yet. This article attempts to fill this legislative gap by drawing on
the domestically and internationally acknowledged fundamental principles that generally
govern the international applicability of domestic law.
Ill. Current State of Practice Regarding the International
Applicability of Domestic Banking Law
Before we turn to the required analysis, it is worth taking a quick look at the current state
of practice. How do the involved agencies use the wide leeway resulting from the lack of
legislation and deal with cross-border issues in the field of banking law?
In Austria, the competent agency, the Finanzmarktaufiicbt (Financial Market Authority
(FMA)), applies a case-by-case assessment. It has neither issued general guidelines regard-
ing the international applicability of the Austrian BWG, nor does it issue ex-ante assess-
ments in specific cases that would help the involved parties determine their legal obligations
under Austrian banking law before they start to engage in a certain business activity. The
FMA tends to apply Austrian banking law extensively to foreign banking activity whenever
such activity has some minimal point of contact to Austria. To merely mail a contractual
declaration from Austrian soil to the foreign bank, for instance, would trigger the obliga-
tion of the foreign bank to comply with Austrian banking law, which, in particular, requires
German branches, representation offices, and subsidiaries of foreign banks in §§ 53, 53a, and 53d, respectively,
and German branches of foreign EEA banks in § 53b; see Hanten, supra note 4, at 1413-15. In the United
States, similar issues are addressed on the federal level in the International Banking Act of 1978 [IBA], 95 Pub.
L. No. 369, 92 Stat. 607 (amended by the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 [FBSEA],
102 Publ. L. No. 242, 105 Stat. 2236). The establishment of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks is
regulated in 12 U.S.C. §§ 3102, 3103 (2006), the establishment of U.S. representative offices of foreign banks
in 12 U.S.C. § 3107. Further, the FBSEA imposes restrictions on foreign banks that own or control a U.S.
conmercial lending company. See Scorr, supra note 1, at 80-82.
14. As granted by art. 49 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, OJ. C 325,
as amended.
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qualification for a banking license.'" The given arguments will be critically discussed in
greater detail in the relevant context below.
In contrast to the FMA, the German Bundesanstalt fir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)) has issued a general statement regarding
its interpretation of the reach of the German banking license requirement.16 Contrary to
the FMNs approach, the BaFin basically employs a kind of balancing approach that takes
into consideration and weighs the conflicting interests involved. As a consequence, not
every minor contact between a banking activity performed by a foreign bank and Germany
is sufficient to trigger the banking license requirement-in contrast to the more rigid view
of the Austrian FMA. Rather, the BaFin makes the applicability of the German KWG
dependent on whether the foreign bank specifically targets the German market. In general,
the BaFin's approach seems to be well-balanced. But, as will be seen in some detail below, 7
its main focus on the specific targeting of the domestic market appears to confuse the goals
of creditor protection and consumer protection and, hence, generates in some cases unde-
sirable results.'"
It is difficult to draw an unambiguous picture of the regulators' position in the United
States, given that fifty state bank regulators can deal with international issues in their very
individual way, with a particular view to their own state's interest.' 9 Nonetheless, it follows
quite clearly from the wide acceptance of the home country principle in the United States
with regard to foreign bank subsidiaries and branches 0 (in-country international busi-
ness) that U.S. regulators generally abstain from imposing compliance with their domestic
banking laws on the weaker2' form of international business conduct-the cross-border
business discussed in this article. But, under special circumstances, particularly when the
U.S. financial market would appear to be critically exposed to a certain form of cross-
border banking activity and the bank's home country supervision would be significantly
inferior, U.S. regulators might apply their banking laws to such cross-border business,
grounded on one of the prevailing general approaches to the extraterritorial application
of U.S. administrative law: the effects approach or the balancing approach. According
to the effects approach, the recipient country's law is applicable to any business conduct
15. See Walter Gapp & Kathrin Gfall, Grenziiberscbreitende Bankgeschdfte obne inldndiscbe Niederlassung--
Internationale Ankniipfung und Konzessionspflicbt [Cross-Border Banking Activities without Domestic Branch-
International Link and License Requirement], 2003 ECOLEX 244, 246-47 (Austria).
16. BaFin, Hinweise zur Erlaubnispflicht nach § 32 Abs. I KWG in Verbindung mit § I Abs. 1 und Abs. la
KWG von grenziiberschreitend betriebenen Bankgeschiften und/oder grenziiberschreitend erbrachten Finan-
zdienstleistungen [German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, Notice on the License Requirement Pur-
suant to § 32(1) in Connection with § 1(1) and (la) of the German Banking Act for Cross-Border Banking
Activities and/or Cross-Border Finance Services], April 2005, http://www.bafin.de/merkblaetter/050400.htm
[hereinafter BaFin].
17. See infra Part IV.E.1.g.
18. For a general discussion of the situation in Germany compare Ohler, supra note 6, at 166 et seq.; Thomas
G6tting, Anwendbares AuJiichtsrecht hei Finanzdienstleistungen im Internet [Supervisory Law Applicable to Financial
Services in the Internet], 2001 CR 528 (F.R.G.); CHRISTOPH WEBER, MARTZUIGANG VON AUSLANDSBANKEN [MAR-
KET AcCESS OF FOREIGN BANKs] 34 (1996).
19. See generally HOWELL EJAcKsON & EDWARD L. SYMONS,JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITuTiONS 51
etseq., 122 etseq. (1999) (discussing the respective competence of state banking regulators as long as the entity
that is providing banking services has not chosen to go for a national charter).
20. See Scor, supra note 1, at 73-96, 99.
21. This form of international business conduct is weaker in terms of intrusion into a foreign country.
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that has effects in the recipient country and was intended to do so.22 In contrast, the less
rigid balancing approach weighs the relevant factors of the case to determine whether the
interests of, and links to, the recipient country are sufficiently strong to justify an assertion
of extraterritorial authority.23 This approach is heavily supported by Section 403 of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the relevance of which will be seen in the
discussion below.
V. Analysis of the International Applicability of Domestic
Banking Law
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS -SCOPE AND GENERAL
RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS
It is important to note that the following analysis does not discuss whether a country's
legislature could deliberately expand the extraterritorial reach of its domestic banking laws
to the desired extent by explicitly adopting a respective provision. For instance, the legisla-
ture of country A could explicitly require every foreign bank that merely makes a business
related telephone call to a person who is at the time of the call present in country A to
comply with country As banking laws, and there would be no discussion at all that country
As financial market authority had to apply such provision. Of course, such legislation might
violate international treaties or at least the internationally accepted and expected comity of
nations.24 It would probably trigger retaliation measures by other countries and might even
cause other countries to terminate bilateral enforcement agreements to preclude country
A from enforcing non-compliance sanctions that country A imposed on the foreign bank.
And most likely, it would simply lead to a substantial decline in foreign banking services
provided to the citizens of country A.
This scenario, however, is not the point of departure for the following analysis. Instead,
this analysis will focus on a situation wherein the legislature has not specifically and explic-
itly addressed the question of applicability of the domestic banking laws to cross-border
business activities. This legislative gap shall be filled in this analysis with a careful inter-
pretation of existing legislative hints, purposes, involved interests, and domestically and
internationally acknowledged fundamental legal principles.
In articulating such a solution, the findings made in this article can also serve as a specific
guideline for legislatures intending to fill the mentioned gap in the future and, thereby,
seeking to adopt a balanced, purposeful solution that is in accordance and consistent with
basic national and international legal standards.
22. The effects approach was first adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1945 in
U.S. v. Aluminum Co. ofAm. and was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993 in the court's 5-to-4 landmark
decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California on the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act. 148 E2d 416,
444 (2nd Cir. 1945); 509 U.S. 764 (1993). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402(l)(c) (1987).
23. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597,613 (9th Cir. 1976). The balancing approach
was applied in Hartford by the four dissenting U.S. Supreme Court Justices. See discussion mpra note 22.
See William S. Dodge, Extaterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,
39 HAv. INTL. L.J. 101 (1998).
24. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38, at 37 (1st ed. 1834) (discussing
comity of nations).
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The following discussion will take the Austrian banking laws as a specific example for
the illustration of the required analysis, with special references to and comparisons with
German and U.S. laws where instructive. Nonetheless, the remarks and findings being
made below are-in light of the article's recourse to the very general principles of national
and international law as well as of legal methodology-intended to serve as guidance also
in other countries that lack an explicit regulation of cross-border banking activities and
pursue similar goals with their banking laws, to illustrate how the problem at hand might
be properly addressed.
B. WORDING OF THE RELEVANT BANKING LAW PROVISIONS
Let us go back now to the foundational point that the legal systems under consider-
ation do not provide for an explicit regulation of the international applicability of domestic
banking law to cross-border banking activities. When a relevant administrative authority
becomes aware of a foreign business activity that potentially is conducted into the authority's
country, it must examine whether it can apply its domestic banking laws to such activity.
The central norm of modern banking laws, and hence the starting point for the following
analysis, is the requirement to obtain a banking license to be allowed to conduct a banking
business. This is the "entry provision" in the world of banking regulation, to which most
further banking provisions, as well as the exertion of administrative supervision, are linked.
Thus, the crucial question for the authority is whether it can and should require the foreign
company to apply for a banking license and to fulfill all obligations related thereto.
Given the lack of special legislation on cross-border issues, the authority first will have
to refer to the ordinary domestic license requiring provision. The relevant Austrian provi-
sions are found in BWG Section 4(1) in connection with Section I(1). BWG Section 4(l)
provides that the conduct of the businesses mentioned in BWG Section l(1) requires a
banking license issued by the FMA.25 BWG Section 1(1) lists twenty-three businesses that
are defined as banking businesses if they are conducted on a regular basis with the intent to
make profits.2 6 The most prominent of these banking activities are the receipt of deposits,27
the granting of loans,28 the deposit of securities,29 the issuance of guarantees,"° and the
factoring of receivables."
None of those provisions contain any reference to the place where such business is
conducted." Looking at the mere wording of the BWG, a Japanese bank receiving a depos-
it in Japan from a Japanese resident and citizen would fall under the Austrian banking
25. BWG § 4(1) is paralleled in Germany by KWG § 32(1) sentence 1.
26. KWG § 1(1) lists twelve banking activities.
27. See BWG § 1(1)(1); likewise KWG § 1(1)(1).
28. See BWG § 1(1)(3); likewise KWG § l(l)(2).
29. See BWG § 1(1)(5); likewise KWG § l(l)(5).
30. See BWG § l(l)(8); likewise KWG § 1(l)(8).
31. See BWG § l(1)(16). Factoring, however, is not a banking activity under the German KWG.
32. German KWG § 32(1), however, provides that a banking license is required for banking activities that
are conducted in Germany. But this limitation does not clarify things at all, because the question at issue then
simply is: When is a cross-border banking activity (deemed to have been) performed in Germany? What if
the bank's counterparty is domiciled in Germany? What about when the underlying contract is signed in
Germany? What about when payments are made to a German account, etc.? So the questions that must be
addressed here are the same as those raised by the insofar completely silent Austrian BWG. See infra. See also
Pfeifer, supra note 12, at 238.
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license requirement, because it conducts a banking business within the wording of BWG
Section 1(1)(1). But it is obvious for several reasons, which will be addressed in more detail
below, that this would be an absurd result; no one would seriously allege that the Austrian
legislature has meant the BWG to apply with such a far extraterritorial reach.
It follows that the literal reach of BWG Section 1(1) has to be narrowed down. A historic
approach to interpretation, achieved by going through the legislative materials to the BWG,
does not reveal any hints by the legislature regarding the intended international reach of
the BWG. 3 Also, the direct transfer of explicit conflict-of-law provisions that have been
adopted in the field of international private law, international criminal law, or special
areas of administrative law-by applying a single analogy in the course of a systematic
interpretation-is impeded by the strong differences between those areas with regard to
purpose, content, and mechanisms of the respective laws.3 4 A response to the question at
hand that is objectively reasoned and, to the highest extent possible, free of arbitrariness and
personal valuation-in short, a response that is in accord with the acknowledged principles of
legal methodology-requires a teleological interpretation (here in the form of a teleological
reduction) by examining the rationale, purpose, and policy behind the provision at issue."
C. TELOS OF DOMESTIC BANKING LAWS
What are the purposes, the teloi, of the Austrian banking license provision (standing
representatively for the similar provisions in many other countries) and the thereto linked
regulatory oversight? Pursuant to BWG Section 69, the FMA, when supervising the finan-
cial institutions under its oversight, must consider the economic interest in a functioning
banking industry and in the stability of the financial market.3 6 Banking laws attempt to
ensure the safety and soundness of banking companies to protect bank creditors.37 The
banking industry needs special attention by regulators due to the systemic risk that a bank
failure poses; given the importance of financial services and the integration of banks in
(at least) their domestic markets, the collapse of a banking company could jeopardize the
viability of the entire economy."
Some banking law provisions are characterized by additional purposes,19 as, for example,
in the United States the Community Reinvestment Act,40 which strongly incentivizes
33. See Beilage Nationalrat [BIgNR] [National Council] Gesetzgebungsperiode [GPI 18 No. 1130 (Austria).
34. Even seemingly related areas such as securities regulation and banking regulation are guided by
considerably differing purposes. While the latter primarily attempts to limit the systemic risk associated with
bank failures and focuses on the oversight of firms rather than transactions, the former is not concerned with
systemic risk but with investor protection and, accordingly, puts its regulatory focus more on transactions and
less on company oversight. See ScoTT, supra note 1, at 99.
35. See FRNz BYDLINSKI, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE UND RECHTSBEGRIFF [LEGAL METHODOLOGY AND
TERM OF LAw] 453 et seq., 480-81 (2nd ed. 1991) (discussing legal methodology in general and teleological
interpretation and teleological reduction in particular).
36. Schopper & Zahradnik, supra note 6, at 27-28. Likewise, for the German KWG, see Ohler, supra note
6, at 165; HERBERT Scm ,sNscY, HERMANN-JOsEF BUNTE & HANs-JORGEN LwowsKI, BANKRECHTS-HANDBUCH
[BANKING LAW HANDBOOK] § 125 para. 12 (2nd ed. 2001).
37. Cf., e.g., BWG § 39. See Gapp & Gfail, supra note 15, at 246; Scott, supra note 1, at 77, 99.
38. See Sco'rr, supra note 1, at 73-75.
39. For a general discussion of the social benefits of financial regulation, see Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in
a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 319 (1999).
40. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2907 (West 2006).
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lending into certain undersupplied markets in order to pursue certain redistributive
goals,4 1 or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,42 which prohibits, among other things,
race-based credit practices. But the fact that such special legislative intent has found its
way into formal banking law provisions is not, in general, determinative for the interpre-
tation of the extraterritorial reach of the provision under consideration, the requirement
to apply and qualify for a banking license.
Furthermore, regulatory bank oversight frequently has the effect of protecting consum-
ers (among others) and preventing unfair competition. But the effects of a certain law are
not to be confused with its purposes. As mentioned, the undisputed and fundamental reason
for the requirement to obtain a banking license and to comply with a detailed set of rules
regarding the organization, capitalization, and activities of a bank is to assure the safety and
soundness of the bank and, hence, to protect its creditors (mainly, its depositors) who are
not only, and not always, consumers. The protection of consumers, as well as the preven-
tion of unfair competition, is particularly targeted by special consumer protection laws and
laws against unfair competition, which apply irrespective of whether the involved company
is a bank. The international applicability of those laws follows quite different consider-
ations, as shown in more detail below.
43
Though BWG Section 69 quite clearly lists the purposes of banking regulation, it does
not contain any geographical reference. However, it is beyond doubt, given the territo-
rial limitations of a country's enforcement power and in light of the self-conception of a
sovereign country's legislature, that the Austrian legislature wants to protect the Austrian
banking industry and the stability of the Austrian financial market.44 But this answers only
the question about the geographical reach of the protected area of domestic banking laws
and says nothing about the geographical reach of the covered activities.
The operability and stability of the Austrian financial market is not only put at risk
by business activities that are conducted entirely in Austria. Extraterritorial behavior-
behavior that physically takes place outside of Austria-can also severely impact the
operability and stability of the Austrian market if such behavior has certain links to this
market. Hence, to protect the stability and operability of the domestic financial market,
a purposefully interpreted domestic banking law might suggest the supervision even of
such extraterritorial behavior.
Therefore, additional goals and policies need to be considered. A legislature that
regulates cases that also involve non-domestic facts does not only pursue its own domestic
goals, it also is concerned with the international consequences of its law making. In partic-
ular, it is safe to assume that a domestic legislature, in general, does not intend to breach an
international treaty or any other agreement imposing international obligations. 45 Further,
a legislature, under normal circumstances, is also keen to comply with non-binding rules of
international legal conduct, be it so-called soft law or generally accepted unwritten inter-
national principles deriving from the general mutual respect among nations. The motiva-
tions for domestic legislatures to comply with such unwritten principles are manifold and
strong. A country's international reputation is likely to depend on such compliance, as well
41. SeeJAcKsoN & SYMONS, supra note 19, at 209-11.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 etseq. (2006).
43. See infra Part IV.E.l.g.
44. This conclusion is clearly evidenced, for instance, by taking a comparative look at the German KWG
§ 32(1); see discussion supra note 32. See Ohler, supra note 6, at 165.
45. Ohler, supra note 6, at 165.
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as the country's prospects for becoming further integrated in the international community
and thereby benefiting from enhanced international cooperation regarding all areas of
life. Non-compliance may cause retaliation by other countries in one form or another.
Therefore, anyone interpreting a domestic provision with a potential extraterritorial reach
needs to consider those international principles with which a domestic legislature can be
expected to wish to comply.
D. TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE
1. Content of the Territoriality Principle
The oldest, most basic, and intuitive principle governing the demarcation of regulating
powers among various countries is the territoriality principle.4 It basically has two pillars.
First, according to the territoriality principle, every sovereign state is entitled to regulate
behavior and events happening on its soil,47 unless such state has partially waived such
right by entering into certain international agreements.48 This is basically undisputed in
the international community.49 Second, as a flip side, a state is generally not competent
to regulate behavior and events that are not happening on its soil, since the arrogation
of regulatory power regarding foreign territory would interfere with the sovereignty of
another, equal state. In the words of Joseph Story, it "would be wholly incompatible with
the equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that other nations should be
at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its own territories."10
But the second pillar of the territoriality principle, though very strong and widely
accepted, is not carved in stone. Many countries have adopted laws that explicitly embrace
the coverage of certain extraterritorial issues that are governed by other, stronger principles
which contravene the idea of a regulatory abstinence in such cases. The most prominent
of those contravening principles are the protection of a country and its institutions against
certain criminal activities abroad, the protection of citizens abroad, and acts among citizens
abroad."'
2. The Diversity of Territorial Links in Cross-Border Cases
and the Problem of Partial Territorial Connections
Despite its general importance, the territoriality principle itself cannot provide a solution
for cases in which it is unclear where the activity at issue took place. Those, however, are
exactly the cross-border situations on which this article focuses. If X, who is located in the
United States, grants a loan (via wire transfer) to Y, who is domiciled in Austria, and both
parties never leave their home country until the loan agreement has been settled, where
46. See Ohler, supra note 6, at 165; Peter Knobl, Recbtsfragen des Online-Broking [Legal .sues of Online-
Broking], in GEORG GRAF & MICHAEL GRUBER (eds.), RECHTSFRAGEN DES INTERNETBANKING [LEGAL ISSUES OF
INTERNET BANKING] 148-50 (2002). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 22,
Introductory Note preceding § 402.
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 22, § 402(1)(a)-(b).
48. Regarding, for instance, activities on the territory of an embassy or concerning activities of an
ambassador.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 22, § 402, cmt c.
50. Story, supra note 24, § 18, at 19.
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 22, § 402(2)-(3); Strafgesetzbuc
[StGB] [Penal Code], Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 60/1974, as amended, §§ 64,65 (Austria); S-IPRG, supra
note 11, art. 133(1).
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has the banking activity of the granting of loans taken place? Obviously, this example has
territorial connections to both the United States and Austria. Are those territorial links
relevant in determining the scope of application of Austrian BWG Section 1(1)? Phrased
from a broader angle, what are, in detail, the possible relevant territorial elements a banking
activity can have?
To start, obvious territorial factors of a case are the residence, the corporate seat or place
of principle business of the provider of the banking service, and the permanent residence of
the recipient of such service. Further, the place where the loan agreement was signed by
either party constitutes a territorial link to the case, since engagement in the business of
lending funds immediately involves and is directed toward the conclusion of loan agree-
ments. If the loan is agreed upon orally, the place where the offer was declared, as well as
the place where the acceptance was declared represent potential territorial links. Likewise,
other relevant places could include the place where the offer or the acceptance was received
by the counterparty, the place where the contract was negotiated or solicited, the place
where the contractual obligations are to be performed, and the place where suit can be
brought regarding claims arising from the contract. And with some creativity, one can easily
find further connecting factors that point to one territory or the other.
What the above discussion demonstrates is that the conduct of a banking business,
as with any other business activity, can be fractionized into dozens of transactional and
status-relating parts or elements that are all important, and even indispensable, in the
course of such business activity. Asking in which territory each one of those parts took
place creates several territorial links. In the given example, many of them point toward the
United States, and many others point towards Austria.
Recall our initial question: Is Austrian BWG Section 1(1), in the absence of any explicit
provision regarding its applicability to cross-border cases like the one at hand, to be inter-
preted to cover the U.S. lender's activities? In other words: Is the outlined partial territorial
connection sufficient for the Austrian FMA to draw on the territoriality principle and claim
its competence to regulate and supervise the U.S. lender?
3. The Differing Gradual Intensity of Territorial Links
The territoriality principle itself is not able to provide an answer to this question. It is
blind with regard to the substance and importance of each territorial link. But it provides
further assistance to consider that the territoriality principle, based on territorial links of
a given case to a certain country, is not built on "either/or" facts, but rather on flexible,
gradual elements that can have different weights on a sliding scale.52 This weight corre-
lates with the importance of the respective territorial link for the determination whether a
country's domestic banking law should be interpreted to also apply to cases of extraterrito-
rial activities. Hence, the stronger the link to a country, the stronger the argument for an
extensive interpretation of such country's banking laws.
But how can such weight be determined for every potential link without assigning it
more or less arbitrarily? In other words: How can one determine which territorial link is the
most significant, which territorial links are relevant, and which are simply irrelevant? Again,
52. See THOMAS SCHOBEL, DER ERSATZ FRUSTRIERTER AUFWENDUNGEN-VERM6GENS-UND NICHTVERMb-
GENSSCHADEN IM OSTERREICHISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT [COMPENSATION FOR FRUSTRATED ExPENSES--
PECUNIARY AND NON-PECUNIARY Loss UNDER AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN LAW] 180-83 (2003) (regarding the
applied legal methodology).
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in other words: Which of the fractionized parts of a business activity-and, therefore, the
places where those parts occurred-are crucial, and which are not?
E. COMBINING TELOS AND TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE
To answer this question, we have to get back to the telos of the provision under consider-
ation. As noted above, 3 the Austrian BWG, as any other national banking law, is intended
to protect and enhance the operability and stability of the domestic financial market. Any
behavior that is capable of infringing on those goals is thus a potential target of domestic
regulatory oversight.
Combining this insight with the implications of, and restrictions flowing from, the ter-
ritoriality principle in an international setting (as outlined in the preceding discussion),
it is possible to rationally determine what territorial links-and hence what places-are
relevant for a prudent interpretation of a banking law's extraterritorial applicability. In
other words, by merging the domestic telos with the territoriality principle we are reviving
the territoriality principle with a new substance.
4
Given that different banking activities potentially jeopardize a country's financial market
operability and stability in different ways and with different intensity, the following analysis
will have to distinguish, where appropriate, between different categories of banking services
when assessing the potential relevance of a territorial link.55 Further, the more complex a
banking activity and the underlying transactions in an international environment become,
the more potential territorial links will emerge. The following analysis attempts to focus
on the obvious and most plausible possible territorial links in a typical, standardized setting
of two parties, the bank and its counterparty, i.e., the recipient of the banking service. The
basic example for reference purposes shall be the classic case, outlined above, 6 of a U.S.
bank granting a loan to an Austrian borrower with neither of the parties being physically
present in its counterparty's country.
1. The Potential Territorial Links and Their Relevance
a. Place of Permanent Physical Presence of the Bank
The most obvious relevant place where a banking activity occurs for purposes of regula-
tory oversight is where the bank is physically located, or more precisely, where the bank
maintains a permanent physical presence from which it provides the banking service at
issue. This can be the operating headquarters, any branch, or even the place where a repre-
sentative office is engaged in processing banking services to customers (like a loan produc-
tion office"). Given the typical integration of a banking company in the local market place
where it is located (through the receipt of deposits from local residents and the lending of
funds to local corporate and private borrowers), the conduct of banking activities and the
53. See supra Part lYC.
54. In a certain way, this approach resembles to some extent the underlying idea of Currie's Interest Analysis
in the field of international private law, by attempting to figure out which territorial links trigger a country's
or a state's interest to govern a given cross-border case. See infra Part I.E. 1. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED
EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-87 (1963). On Interest Analysis in general, see LEA BRILMAYER & JAcK
GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 181 et seq. (5th ed. 2002).
55. Cf similarly Andreas Zahradnik & Florian Kremslehner in OTTO Lucius & ANDREAS ZAKOSTELSKY (eds.),
INTERNETBANKING 183 (2002).
56. See supra Part VD.2.
57. See ScOtr, supra note 1, at 69.
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well-being of the bank at stake are of immediate relevance for the operability and stability
of the financial market where the bank is located.
b. Place of Incorporation of the Bank
In contrast to that, the mere incorporation of a bank in a certain country, without pro-
viding banking services to residents of said country, cannot affect such country's financial
market in a comparable way. If this bank failed, no depositor or other creditor would be
impaired in said country. Hence, the place of incorporation of the banking service provider
is not a relevant territorial link for purposes of determining the potential extraterritorial
reach of domestic banking law. 8
c. Place of Domicile of the Counterparty
The place where the counterparty of the bank, the recipient of the banking service, is
domiciled59 is obviously relevant. Given that the recipient is typically well-integrated in its
local market, irregularities in the conduct of the banking activities could negatively affect
the recipient's local market, even when the bank is located in a foreign country.
But it is easy to see that this territorial link, against the background of the involved
banking laws, is usually not as strong as the link established by the place where the bank
is located. The bankruptcy of the U.S. bank in the above example obviously affects the
U.S. economy much more than it affects the Austrian economy because-in a typical
setting-the U.S. bank is much more deeply integrated in the U.S. market and has many
more parties relying on the bank's soundness in the United States than it does in Austria.
This might be different in a case where the foreign bank is located in a country bordering
Austria and, hence, has extensive business contacts with thousands of other Austrian domi-
ciliaries. In this case, the Austrian economy might be exposed to the safety and soundness
of such foreign bank in a way similar to the exposure of the financial market in the country
where such foreign bank maintains its permanent physical presence.
Furthermore, not every type of banking activity is capable of jeopardizing the recipi-
ent's market. Only activities that result in the bank being the debtor, such as the receipt
of deposits, the issuance of notes, or the issuance of guarantees, put the recipient of the
banking service and, as a result of such recipient's being integrated in her local market,
also this local market at risk. The situation is different when the bank engages in activities
that result in the bank being the creditor, such as the granting of loans or the factoring of
receivables. To illustrate, recall again the above example of a U.S. bank granting a loan to
an Austrian borrower: The Austrian borrower-and with her the operability and stability of
the Austrian financial market-is, exceptional circumstances aside, unaffected by the U.S.
bank's failure.
It follows that the relevance of the domicile of the bank's counterparty depends on the
type of banking activity at issue. This distinction would, for example, give an objective rea-
son to interpret the potential international applicability of BWG Section l(l)(3) (granting
of loans) and BWG Section 1(1)(16) (factoring of receivables) more restrictively than in
58. See also Ohler, supra note 6, at 164.
59. For a widely accepted definition of domicile see S-IPRG, supra note 11, art. 20; see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws §§ 9 et seq. (1934).
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the case of BWG Section l(l)(1) (receipt of deposits) or BWG Section 1(1)(8) (issuance
of guarantees).
We have also seen that the domicile of the recipient generally constitutes a weaker
territorial link than the place of the permanent physical presence of the bank,60 unless the
foreign bank is engaged in the recipient country's market with a similar intensity as in its
home market, which hardly ever will be the case-keeping in mind that at issue is cross-
border banking business where the bank is not physically present in the recipient country.
Hence, the more banking services are provided to domiciliaries of the recipient country
and the higher the amount of financial funds involved, the stronger the argument for an
extensive interpretation of the recipient country's banking laws.
6
1
d. Place of Signing
Of what relevance is the place where the agreement underlying the provision of a
particular banking service is signed by the bank and the counterparty? Assume that the
loan agreement between the U.S. bank and the Austrian borrower in our example was
signed by a bank officer while being aboard a Canadian airplane flying over Mexican soil
on a business trip to Chile. Clearly, neither Canada, Mexico nor Chile has any interest in
regulating the loan between a U.S. resident and an Austrian resident. The same applies
if the Austrian counterparty signs the loan agreement while on vacation in the Italian
Dolomites. The operability and stability of Italy's financial market remain completely
unaffected by this transaction. Hence, the place where a contract is signed does not con-
stitute a relevant territorial link.
e. Place of Offer and Acceptance
The discussion above applies mutatis mutandis to cases in which the contract is
concluded orally. The place where the offer is spoken, or heard, is as irrelevant as the
place where the acceptance is spoken, or heard, when considered against the background
of the regulatory purpose of the BWG. Nonetheless, some Austrian commentators, among
them staff members of the FMA, claim that the Austrian BWG would govern any banking
transaction in cases where the offer or the acceptance was declared in Austria.6 In light
of the lack of comprehensible reasoning, it seems unlikely that such commentators would
stick to their assertion if they simply considered a loan given from a Canadian bank to a
Norwegian resident who called to give her final okay while on a weekend skiing trip in the
Austrian Alps. Austria has no interest in this banking activity whatsoever-its economy
and financial market are not put at any risk by such transaction.
Hence, the FMA, by requiring the Canadian bank in this case to comply with the
Austrian BWG (particularly to apply and qualify for an Austrian banking license), would
severely misinterpret the BWG by giving it a content, regarding its geographical reach,
that a reasonable legislature, which respects the equality and sovereignty of other countries
in accordance with the territoriality principle, likely would not have given it in the absence
of any overriding domestic interests in the case.
60. The relevance of this finding will be seen below. See infra Part IVE2.b.
61. This comparative sentence will be integrated in a comparative balancing approach below. See infra Part
IVF.2.c.i. and note 94.
62. Gapp & Gfall, supra note 15, at 245-47; WALTER FREMUTH, ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM BWG (CoMMEN-
TARY ON THE AUsTRIAN BANKING ACT] § 9 para. 1 (1999); LEO W. CHINI & GEORG FROLICHSTHAL, PRAXISKoM-
MENTAR ZUM BANKWESENGESETZ [PRACTICE COMMENTARY ON THE AUSTRIAN BANKING ACT] § 9 para. 18 (1997).
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f. Place of Negotiations
For the very same reasons that have just been discussed regarding the place where an
offer was made or accepted, the place where the contract that underlies the provision of a
banking service was negotiated between the bank and its counterparty is not related to the
geographical scope of the risk associated with a particular banking activity and, hence, is
not a relevant territorial link.63
g. Place of Solicitation
What relevance does the place where banking activities are advertised and the conclusion
of banking contracts is solicited have? The German BaFin, appearing to pay particular
attention to the solicitation of banking services, announced to apply the KWG to any for-
eign bank that "specifically targets the German market." 64 But what threat does solicitation
pose to the domestic financial market? First, if cross-border solicitation of a foreign bank
finally results in the conclusion of banking contracts with domestic customers, then such
transaction would already, and undisputedly, feature a relevant territorial link to the recipi-
ent country, namely the domicile of the bank's counterparty, as noted above.6 And second,
mere solicitation (solicitation that remains entirely unsuccessful in attracting domestic
customers and hence does not lead to the conclusion of banking contracts with custom-
ers) does not, in general, jeopardize the domestic financial market since it has not created
domestic creditors who would suffer losses from the foreign bank's bankruptcy.
Even aggressive advertising, possibly going along with price dumping, does not make it
necessary to expand the international reach of the domestic banking laws. First, although
such aggressive solicitation generally has the ability to irritate a market by potentially
causing other banks to-possibly unhealthily-adapt their business models to match the
aggressive pricing strategy of the foreign competitor, such irritation would only last for a
very short time, given that the aggressive solicitation turns out to be entirely unsuccessful,
as a premise of the above scenario. Second, and foremost, because the threat emanating
from aggressive solicitation is not a bank-specific problem, it is already addressed by laws
not specific to banking, such as laws against unfair competition and anti-dumping codes.66
Those laws pursue different goals than the banking laws; they are not designed to improve
the safety and soundness of certain companies, but rather to assure fair competition as the
motor for innovation, efficiency enhancement, and price reduction. Hence, the question
of international applicability of laws against unfair competition is governed by different
considerations. Those laws would clearly be applicable to any form of domestic advertising
by a foreign bank and would allow domestic competitors to file for injunctive relief and
damages.
67
Taking a closer look to the reasoning of the BaFin Notice on License Requirement
(2005), it can be seen that the BaFin consequently distinguishes between cases where
large institutional counterparties are targeted and cases where private retail customers
63. The German BaFin, however, suggests considering which side initiated entering into the contract; the
reasons for this distinction are not made clear, but seem to be rooted in consumer protection considerations.
See BaFin, supra note 16. Such concerns are discussed below. See infra Part D.E.l.g.
64. See BaFin, supra note 16.
65. See supra Part W.E. I .c.
66. See, e.g., the Austrian Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] [Unfair Competition Act],
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 448/1984, as amended, (Austria).
67. See Schopper & Zahradnik, supra note 6, at 24-26.
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(consumers) are targeted.61 Only if the latter group is solicited or contracted by the foreign
bank does the BaFin require such bank to comply with German banking law. Hence, it
seems that the BaFin is more concerned about the protection of consumers than it is about
general creditor protection through regulatory enhancement of safety and soundness of
banks. Though the viable operability and stability of a financial market also serves the
interests of the consumers in such market, consumer protection is not the ultimate pur-
pose of banking regulation, as was shown above.6" This is most obviously demonstrated by
the fact that special consumer protection legislation has been adopted in developed legal
systems.7° As noted, the international applicability of consumer protection laws is governed
by considerations different from those relevant in the field of banking law. Consumer pro-
tection law is mostly private law,7 and hence follows the conflict-of-law rules developed
in international private law. Since consumer protection provisions typically are among the
strictest layers of mandatory private law (so-called positive order public),72 they are widely
regarded to be applicable even in cases where the parties have agreed upon a choice-of-
law clause that aims to put the contract entirely under the governance of a foreign law.
Therefore, the consumer protection provisions of the German Civil Code already apply to
the cross-border activities of a foreign bank vis-i-vis German consumers, no matter what
choice-of-law clause the parties have incorporated in their contract. So, if the foreign bank
tries to take advantage of unsophisticated German consumers by luring them into highly
unfavorable contracts, the German consumers can rely on the remedies granted by the
consumer protection provisions of the German Civil Code; they need not be particularly
protected by the regulatory banking laws.
Summarizing the above, solicitation73 is not a relevant territorial link for purposes of
determining the international applicability of domestic banking law. This can be easily put
to a plausibility test. Assume a Swiss bank plans to reinforce its efforts to target wealthy
Swiss individuals by launching an advertising campaign in a classy golf resort in Germany,
where most of the guests are from Switzerland because it lies right beyond the Swiss bor-
der. The campaign comprises billboard and event advertising that is supposed to create
awareness for a new wealth management product. On every single piece of information
it is noted that only Swiss domiciliaries are eligible to enter into this wealth management
contract with the Swiss bank. Does this solicitation pose any threat to the German finan-
cial market? It clearly does not, even though the solicitation geographically takes place in
Germany. Hence, there is no plausible reason to require the Swiss bank to comply with
German banking law and, in particular, to qualify for a German banking license pursuant
to KWG Section 32(1).14
68. See BaFin, supra note 16, sections 1, 2.b.
69. See supra Part IV.C.
70. See, e.g., Knmumentenschutzgesetz [KSchG] [Consumer Protection Act], Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No.
140/1979, as amended, (Austria); Biirgerlicbes Gesetzbucb [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 1, 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBI.] I at 42, 2909, as amended, §§ 13-14, 305-310, 312-312f, 346-359, 474-479 (F.R.G.).
7 1. Compare, for example, its implementation in the German Civil Code. See supra note 70.
72. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature in Rome
on June 19, 1980 (80/934/EEC), art. 5(2) [hereinafter Rome Convention].
73. Remember, we are discussing the relevance of a mere solicitaion-a solicitation that does not result in the
conclusion of contracts with domestically domiciled counterparties. Once a solicitation leads to the conclusion
of a contract, the territorial link of domicile of the counterparty comes into play.
74. The BaFin appears to agree with this conclusion. See BaFin, supra note 16.
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h. Place of Performance of Contractual Obligations
The place where the contractual obligations between the bank and its counterparty are
to be performed is no relevant territorial link either. Assume a German bank takes deposits
from an Austrian depositor. It would not make any material difference for BWG purposes
if the bank were supposed to repay the deposit via wire transfer to the depositor's account
with an Austrian bank or to her account with a Dutch bank. If the German bank fails, the
Austrian depositor and, as a possible consequence, the depositor's creditors, who are most
likely Austrian residents, are affected, no matter where the payment, as a technical matter
pursuant to the contractual terms, was supposed to be received.
i. Applicable Private Law and Place of Personal Jurisdiction
Does the applicable private law that is governing the underlying banking transaction
have any relevance in determining whether the cross-border banking activity is governed by
the recipient country's banking law? A choice-of-law clause in a loan agreement, which opts
for the applicability of a particular private law regime, has no influence on the applicable
regulatory law. The contractual intent of private parties is not, in the absence of special
legislation to the contrary, able to modify the regulatory competence of an administrative
authority. Regulatory banking law is, in the diction of private law, mandatory law, and not
default law.
But even when the applicable private law is not determined by a contractual conflict-of-
law clause, but rather by the state's legislative or common law conflict-of-law rules, it does
not create a relevant territorial link that goes beyond the already determined links. Assume
that a loan agreement between a French bank and an Austrian borrower is governed by
French law, because the applicable conflict-of-law rules point to the domicile or principle
place of business of the party that provides the characteristic service.7" The applicable
private law, as can be seen in this example, follows from a territorial link that was already
considered above as being a major territorial link for purposes of interpreting the extrater-
ritorial reach of a regulatory statute. Considering the applicable private law as an addi-
tional link would thus lead to an illegitimate double count of the territorial link constituted
by the bank's place of permanent physical presence. The fact that the courts of a particular
country have authority to sit over contractual claims flowing from banking contracts (be it
pursuant to statutory provisions or contractual choice-of-jurisdiction clauses) also has, for
the same reasons, no relevance for the applicability of regulatory banking law.
2. Summary: The Relevant Territorial Links
The above list of possible territorial links does not claim to be exhaustive. With some
creativity, one can fractionize a banking activity into further parts and can construe addi-
tional theoretical connections that point to one territory or another. But the above analysis
clearly focuses on the obvious and most plausible of the possible territorial links. It was
easy to see that the more far-fetched the territorial links became, the more obvious it
was that they were irrelevant for the interpretation of the international reach of domestic
banking laws.
Only two elements of a cross-border case could be identified that represent a relevant ter-
ritorial link when the telos of the banking law being interpreted is taken into consideration.
The first, and strongest of the two, is the place where the provider of the banking service
75. Rome Convention, spra note 72, art. 4.
VOL. 41, NO. 1
HOME COUNTRY OR RECIPIENT COUNTRY? 93
is located.76 The second relevant territorial link is the domicile of the banks' counterparty,
with two caveats. First, if the underlying banking transaction puts the counterparty in the
debtor position, then the counterparty's domicile normally does not constitute a convinc-
ing argument for an extensive extraterritorial reach of the counterparty's domestic banking
laws. Second, even if the business activity at issue puts the counterparty in the creditor
position, the territorial link constituted by the counterparty's domicile is weaker than the
bank's place of business, unless the bank is engaged in the recipient country's market with
a similar intensity (with a similar amount of customer contacts and involved funds) as in its
home market."
This conclusion, finding relevant only the places where the bank and its counterparty
are physically located, can be easily put to the test. Assume those two territorial links point
to the same country, whereas all other links examined above point to another country. To
illustrate, assume a bank located in Austria grants a loan to a borrower domiciled in Austria,
but the underlying agreement is negotiated and signed by both parties in the United States,
payments are made from and to U.S. accounts, U.S. private law governs the agreement
pursuant to a choice-of-law clause, and all the other links mentioned above involve the
United States. Despite this large number of links to a foreign country, it is beyond doubt
that the mentioned bank would have to comply with Austrian banking law. In the reverse
case where a U.S. bank grants a loan to a U.S. borrower, but the other mentioned elements
are linked to Austria, it is obvious that the Austrian BWG is not supposed to apply, because
the operability and stability of the Austrian economy in general, and the financial market
in particular, are not jeopardized or otherwise affected by the banking activity at issue.
Hence, Austria has no interest in overseeing such banking business, and the BWG must be
interpreted accordingly.
E THE REQUIRED STRENGTH OF THE RELEVANT TERRITORIAL LINKS
The above findings narrow the problem of international applicability of domestic bank-
ing law substantially, for they sharpen the focus on two relevant territorial links and remedy
the wide-spread confusion about the other, irrelevant, links. But the main question that
still remains is whether each link is per se sufficient to argue for the respective country's
competence to regulate the cross-border conducted banking business in a case where the
two territorial links are split between two countries.
1. International Applicability of Home Country's Banking Laws
The answer is easily found for the stronger link. The banking laws of the country where
the bank is located (home country) apply-in accordance with the domestic telos as well
as the territoriality principle-not only to the purely domestic business of the bank, but
also to any kind of international activities in which the bank engages. Otherwise the bank's
76. This finding is supported by the European Commission, which states in an Interpretative Communica-
tion that a banking service, in general, shall be deemed to take place where the "'characteristic performance'
of the service, i.e., the essential supply for which payment is due," occurred. Commission Interpretative
Communication: Freedom to Provide Services and the Interest of the General Good in the Second Banking
Directive, June 20, 1997, O.J. C 209/04, SEC (97) 1193 final. The concept of the prevalence of the charac-
teristic performance was developed in the field of international private law. It points to the place where the
party whose obligation is not the payment of money is domiciled. See, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 72,
art. 4(2); S-IPRG, supra note 11, art. 117(2).
77. See supra Part IVE. I.c.
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home country supervisor could not examine and evaluate the bank's safety and soundness,
which is a resultant of both the bank's national and international activities, and, as a conse-
quence, would not be able to care for the operability and stability of the domestic financial
market.7"
2. International Applicability of Recipient Country's Banking Laws
But what about the weaker link, pointing to the country of domicile of the bank's
counterparty? Is it, though weaker than the bank's place of business, still strong enough
to extend the reach of domestic banking law to banking activities that partly occur extra-
territorially?
a. The Principle of Appropriateness, Reasonableness, and Efficiency
To answer this question, we need to consider a further basic principle that governs
the adoption of legislation and, likewise, the interpretation of ambiguous provisions: the
principle of appropriateness, reasonableness, and efficiency (hereinafter the principle of
reasonableness). This widely accepted principle,79 though not explicitly laid down in many
countries' legal systems, is considered a fundamental constitutional"0 guideline restraining
the legislature's liberty to adopt any legislation it sees fit. Basically, the principle of reason-
ableness is asking whether a certain law is capable of and necessary for achieving the legis-
lature's goal and whether the measures taken appear to be appropriate vis-a-vis the aspired
goal. In other words, the social costs of the law shall not be greater than its attempted
social benefits. A statute, regulation, or merely a single provision that does not comply
with these three requirements of efficient legislation is voidable. Equally important, the
principle of reasonableness is used as a guideline for the interpretation of ambiguous pro-
visions. If the wording of a certain provision allows for two possible interpretations, the
one that is in compliance with the principle of reasonableness shall prevail.81
b. Equivalent (or Stronger) Supervision by Home Country
Let us return now to the task of interpreting BWG Section 1(1) and its ambiguous
extraterritorial reach. According to the principle of reasonableness, we must ask whether
the application of BWG Section 1(1) is capable, necessary and appropriate to protect and
enhance the operability and stability of the Austrian financial market. To illustrate, assume
a U.S. bank is taking deposits from an Austrian depositor. From the discussion above
we know that this banking activity is, in any event, covered by U.S. banking laws and,
78. See ScoTr, supra note 1, at 77-84.
79. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw highlights the importance of the principle of
reasonableness, actually, for the particular problem of international applicability of domestic law:
Territoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to prescribe, but in determining
their meaning rigid concepts have been replaced by broader criteria embracing principles of reason-
ableness and fairness to accommodate overlapping or conflicting interests of states, and affected private
interests. Courts and other decision makers, learning from the approach to comparable problems in pri-
vate international law, are increasingly inclined to consider various interests, examine contacts and links,
give effect to justified expectations, search for the 'center of gravity' of a given situation, and develop
priorities. This Restatement follows this approach in adopting the principle of reasonableness.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, supra note 22, Introductory Note preceding § 402. See also
BYLINSKI, supra note 35, at 330-35.
80. In Austria, for instance, the principle of reasonableness is derived from the constitutional principle of
equal treatment.
81. So-called constitution-compliant interpretation. See BYDLINSKI, supra note 35, at 455-57.
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hence, by U.S. regulatory oversight. Given that, would supervision by the Austrian FMA
really be necessary to protect the Austrian financial market? In a scenario in which the U.S.
banking laws provide for an equal or even stronger supervision that ensures an equal or
even higher degree of safety and soundness of the supervised bank, the answer is clearly
no. And it is likewise obvious that additional oversight by the FMA and the requirement
to comply with additional regulations in the mentioned scenario would not be appropriate
given that the additional costs caused by such double regulation would not be paralleled by
additional benefits.
Hence, if the protection provided by the home country's banking laws and their enforce-
ment is equivalent to the recipient country's oversight, application of the recipient country's
banking laws is not reasonable. 2 Quite to the contrary, the costs caused by such additional
regulation could negatively impact the safety and soundness of the affected banks, or could
at least lead to an increase of the price of banking services, particularly of cross-border
services, which in turn would reduce competition in the domestic market. So, eventually,
the additional costs of unnecessary additional regulation would be borne by the group of
people that domestic banking laws actually intend to benefit-the domestic counterparties
of foreign banks.
To assess the equivalence of a bank's home country supervision and the potentially
applicable recipient country supervision, the concrete circumstances of the case at hand,
particularly the type of banking service involved, must be examined. If, for example, the
receipt of deposits is at issue, it is important not only to compare bank capital requirement
provisions, disclosure and notification requirements, internal risk assessment systems, and
other precautions, but also to look into the characteristics of the statutory deposit insur-
ance systems. If it turns out that the home country's deposit insurance does not cover the
cross-border deposit or covers it to a substantially smaller amount, then the application of
the recipient country's regime obviously would create a benefit for the depositor and the
financial market in which she is located and would therefore make the extension of the
extraterritorial reach of the relevant banking laws reasonable.
Summarizing the above, we can conclude that if the applicability of two essentially
equivalent regulatory regimes is at issue, the principle of appropriateness, reasonableness,
and efficiency commands that only one of those regimes is to govern the case. This appli-
cable regime is determined by the stronger territorial link of the case, which points, as
already demonstrated, to the country where the bank is located.
This conclusion is again supported by the European Commission's Interpretative
Communication on Freedom to Provide Services and the Interest of the General Good
in the Second Banking Directive. 3 In general, the harmonization of domestic banking
law in the EEA and the mutual recognition of each country's banking supervision among
EEA member states, as provided for in the Second Banking Directive, will usually bar
an EEA country from claiming that the banking laws of another EEA country are infe-
rior. Hence, cross-border banking services provided within the EEA should normally not
be subject to the recipient country's banking supervision. But, as mentioned, the ques-
tion as to whether the home country's oversight is equivalent must be assessed for every
single case. If, for instance, a particular business activity is not a banking activity pursuant
82. Compare the similar considerations adopted by the BaFin. See BaFin, supra note 16, section 2.a. See alo
RESTATEMENT (FHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 22, § 403(1).
83. See supra note 76.
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to the home country's banking laws, and is therefore not covered by the oversight of the
banking regulator, then, even within the EEA, the recipient country's banking authority
can reasonably argue to require the foreign entity to comply with its banking laws if those
laws classify the entity's activity as banking business; A similar situation might occur when
the bank's home country defaults on its obligation to implement EU directives that further
harmonize the member states' banking laws.
c. Weaker Supervision by Home Country
We have now limited the unresolved cases to cross-border banking transactions where
the bank is the debtor8' and the bank's home country establishes a weaker form of regula-
tory oversight than the recipient country's banking laws would provide. In these remaining
cases, the additional oversight by the recipient country's financial market authority would
indeed enhance the protection of the operability and stability of the recipient country's
financial market and would therefore create a valuable social benefit. But the question still
is whether this benefit outweighs the social costs triggered by the requirement to addition-
ally comply with the recipient country's banking laws. If this question were, according to
empirical economic evidence that distinguishes between the different circumstances in dif-
ferent cases, to be answered in the affirmative, the relevant banking law provisions should
be interpreted in favor of their applicability to the respective case under consideration.
The economic analysis of law, the judicial relevance of which is rooted particularly in the
principle of reasonableness outlined above, is more frequently an accepted instrument for
the interpretation of ambiguous legal provisions. 8" But as long as the required empirical set
of data on this point is not available (the social benefits of the additional supervision by the
recipient country are particularly difficult to quantify) with the required level of certainty
and reliability,86 the solution to the problem at issue has to be found by comparatively
balancing the interests involved.
i) Comparative Balancing Approach The theoretical framework behind the
comparative balancing approach (which, methodologically, is a form of general analogy) 7
is simple, conclusive, and convincing. When the balanced elements of an unresolved
case have the same weight (i.e., they point with the same strength to a certain legal
consequence) as the balanced elements of a case that is unambiguously governed by a
particular statute, then the specific legal consequence that is provided for in such statute shall
apply also to the unresolved case.' 8 Applied to the problem at hand, this means to compare
an unresolved cross-border business case with an in-country international business case in
which, as outlined above,89 the application of domestic banking law is, in the absence of
84. See supra Part IV.E.2.
85. See BYDLINSKI, supra note 35, at 331-32; see also Thomas Schobel, The Presumption of Profitability on
Expenditures, 2002 ERPL 458 (Netherlands).
86. But see Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and
Potential Implications, The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 521, August
2005. In this recent insightful study, Jackson elaborates on the difficulties of measuring regulatory costs and
benefits of financial regulation, but still manages to draw some interesting international comparisons between
the costs of financial regulation in different countries and thereby prepares the basis for future studies that
might produce the required data for the problem at hand.
87. See BYDLINSKI, supra note 35, at 5 36-43; SCHOBEL, supra note 52, at 179-83.
88. See SCHOSEL, supra note 52, at 181-82, 211-14.
89. See supra Part I.A.
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legislation to the contrary, beyond question because the bank is physically present in the
counterparty's country.
A weak form of such physical presence is the operation of a representative office, like a
loan or deposit production office.' These offices neither issue contractual offers or accep-
tances, nor make business decisions regarding the granting of loans or receipt of deposits.
Rather, they provide support in the distribution of banking services by generating loan
and deposit requests and coordinating the respective contractual declarations between
their headquarters (or other decision making units) and the counterparty. Therefore, a
representative office takes part in the business of banking. Since such banking activity
is conducted through a physical presence in the territory of the host country, it clearly
falls under the scope of application of the host country's banking laws, which requires
the foreign bank that the representative office is part of to comply with the host country's
banking license requirement.
The argument being developed here is the following: Suppose a cross-border bank-
ing service potentially jeopardizes the operability and stability of the recipient country's
financial market in a similar way and to a similar extent as does the in-country inter-
national banking services conducted by the same foreign bank through a representative
office that is located in the recipient country. To illustrate, assume that Turkish bank X
is operating a representative office in Austria in order to attract deposits from Austrian
depositors, whereas Turkish bank Y is offering its deposit taking services solely via Internet
to Austrian depositors. Further assume that deposit taking services are considerably less
intensely regulated and supervised by Turkish authorities than they would be pursuant to
the Austrian banking laws.9 Since X is, without doubt, engaged in the business of bank-
ing on Austrian soil pursuant to BWG Section 1(1)(1), such activity is-in full accordance
with the territoriality principle-governed by Austrian regulatory oversight.92 If we can
find that the relevant balanced interests involved in this case (the solved case), expressed
by the balanced social costs and benefits of a potential regulation, are more or less equal
to the balanced interests involved in Y's case (the unsolved case), then the principles of
consistency and equity require that BWG Section 1 (1) be interpreted to apply to the cross-
border banking activity in the unsolved case, as well.
To assess the similarity of the costs and benefits-and, in particular, their balance-in
the solved case and the unsolved case, the concrete circumstances must be taken into con-
sideration individually for every single case. In the example above, the potential costs of
compliance with an additional regulatory regime (the Austrian) are the same for both bank
X and bank Y, assuming that the hypothetical banks have a similar size, corporate struc-
ture, and organization. But the social benefits stemming from the additional regulation
might be different, depending on the intensity and scope of X's and Y's respective conduct
of business with regard to Austrian counterparties. To illustrate, assume X is contracting
through its representative office with 10,000 Austrian counterparties, accumulating depos-
its in the total amount of EUR 200 million, whereas Y, because of a less successful business
90. See Scorr, supra note I, at 69.
91. If the Turkish banking laws provided for a comparable oversight, the case would be covered by the
discussion regarding equivalent oversight by the home country (see supra Part IV..2.b) and, in accordance with
the findings made there, Austrian banking law would not be applicable to the cross-border service provided
by bank Y.
92. In the absence of bilateral agreements to the contrary.
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model, an intentionally restricted focus, or whatever other reason, manages to enter into
deposit agreements via the Internet with only ten Austrian domiciliaries for total deposits
amounting to EUR 100,000. Assume further that Y has entered into an irrevocable pri-
vate deposit insurance system that unlimitedly covers all deposits taken by Y and that is
provided by a strong, well-known international insurance company. It is obvious from the
mentioned facts that the risk posed by X's banking activities to the operability and stability
of the Austrian financial market (and the Austrian economy in general) is much bigger
than the risk associated with Y's activities. Hence, the benefits that would be achieved if the
BWG were applied to V's cross-border banking activities are considerably smaller than the
benefits that are achieved by requiring X to comply with Austrian banking law.
If Y, however, had taken deposits in a similar amount from a similar number of Austrian
depositors as X did, then it would be perfectly reasonable and consistent to apply the legal
consequence in the solved case of X also to the unsolved case of Y, in other words, to
interpret BWG Section 1(1) to cover the particular cross-border banking service provided
by Y and, in particular, to require Y to apply and qualify for the issuance of an Austrian
banking license.
ii) A Comparative Guideline-Factors to Consider Since the solved case, as has just
been demonstrated, is supposed to serve as a standard of comparison-an interpretative
guideline that exemplifies the legislature's intent-, the concrete facts constituting such
case have to be chosen to represent the typical risk and threat that is posed to the financial
market by the weakest form of international business conduct that is just within the
undisputed territorial reach of the host country's banking laws. The unresolved cases of
cross-border provided business are then measured against this standard.9 3
As mentioned, the comparison and balancing of the relevant elements must be done on
a case-by-case basis. Hence, there is no general solution for those remaining cases. But it
is still possible, and not less valuable, to offer a general guideline for solving those cases by
pointing out the factors that a prudent interpretation based on the comparative balancing
of involved interests will have to take into consideration. Given that high costs and small
benefits point in the same direction, we can combine such factors in the following com-
parative sentence: 94 The smaller (a) the number of counterparties of the foreign bank in the
recipient country, (b) the amount of funds involved in the cross-border banking activities,
(c) the negative 9 difference of the home country's banking supervision (on the legislative as
well as on the enforcement side) compared to the potential recipient country's supervision
(particularly regarding minimum capital requirements and mandatory safety nets), and (d)
the differences in the corporate structure and corporate governance regimes for banks in
the home country and banks in the recipient country, and the higher (x) the level of individu-
ally acquired insurance coverage or other measures taken voluntarily by the foreign bank
to enhance creditor protection and (y) the routineness of the provided banking services
93. See SCHOBEL, supra note 52, at 208-14 (regarding the applied methodology).
94. See Gerhard Otte, ZurAnwvendung komparativer Stze im Recbt [On the Application of Comparative Sentences
in the Law], in FRANz BYDLINSKI, ET AL., DAS BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM IM GELTENDEN IJND KONFTIGEN RECHT [THE
FLEXIBLE SYSTEM IN CURRENT AND FUTURE LAw] 271 (1986) (regarding the relevance and structure of compara-
tive sentences); Schobel, supra note 52, at 180.
95. If the difference were zero or even positive (in other words, if the home country's supervision is stronger
than the recipient country's supervision), then-according to the remarks made in Part IV.E2.b above-the
extraterritorial applicability of the recipient country's banking laws need not be considered from the outset.
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regarding involved risk, price, and transparency (measured against the market standard
present in the recipient country), the more restrictively BWG Section 1(1) is to be inter-
preted, i.e., the more narrowly the boundaries of its applicability should be drawn.
d. A Summarizing Illustration
For a final, summarizing illustration, let us apply this analysis to the following example.
The solution outlined below shall, at the same time, provide an overview of the conclusions
of this article.
In the course of an international securitization of pooled receivables owned by origina-
tors from different countries, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is set up on the Cayman
Islands (mainly due to tax reasons). Among the originators is X, an Austrian car dealer, who
wishes to refinance her outstanding receivables vis- -vis her customers amounting to a total
of EUR 10 million. As part of the securitization, the SPV purchases the receivables from
X without recourse. Let us further assume, for purposes of this example, that the purchase
price is due two days after delivery of the receivables. To secure X's claim, a well-known
U.K. bank issues a respective guarantee. Is the SPV engaged in the business of banking pur-
suant to BWG Section 1(1) and, as a result, does it have to apply and qualify for an Austrian
banking license pursuant to BWG Section 4(1)?
The purchase of receivables as part of a regular business and for profit, generally, consti-
tutes factoring, which is considered a banking activity pursuant to BWG Section l(1)(16).
But does the applicability of the BWG reach so far that it also embraces a cross-border
factoring activity like the one in our example? A territorial link that is pointing to Austria
in this case is the domicile of SPVs counterparty, X. Normally, factoring without recourse
does not put the seller in the position of a creditor, which challenges the relevance of the
counterparty's domicile as a valid territorial link for purposes of a teleological interpreta-
tion of BWG Section 1(l)(16). 96 In the case at hand, however, the advance delivery of X
puts her, even though only for two days, in the position of a creditor. X will be directly
affected if the SPV fails after X delivers the receivables. This generally could give reason
to the Austrian banking regulator to protect X and the market in which she is integrated
(here the Austrian market). But is this link strong enough to justify the extraterritorial
applicability of BWG Section l(1)(16)? According to the principle of reasonableness, the
first question to ask in a cost-benefit analysis applied to this problem is whether the cross-
border banking activity is already governed by the regulatory supervision of the SPVs
home country banking authority and whether such supervision is comparable to the
potential oversight by the Austrian FMA.97 Since the Cayman regulator does not consider
factoring to be a banking activity subject to supervision, this question must be answered in
the negative as applied to the case at hand. Hence, supervision by the FMA would likely
create benefits for the operability and stability of the Austrian market, which are the main
teloi of the BWG.98 But without examining the extent of those expected benefits under
the specific circumstances of the case at issue, comparing them to solved cases, 99 and bal-
ancing them with the expected costs of potential Austrian oversight, the determination
of the BWG's international applicability would be arbitrary. Measured against the above
96. See supra Part lME. I.c.
97. See supra Part IV.E2.a.
98. See BWG, supra note 13, § 69; see aro supra Part IV.C.
99. See supra Part IV..E2.c.i.
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guideline of factors to be considered in this kind of comparative balancing approach, the
case at hand appears to show high costs and small benefits. The SPV has only one Austrian
counterparty and the amount of money involved is rather small given the size of the Aus-
trian financial market. Furthermore, the counterparty's claim was secured by a guarantee
of a sound and strongly supervised U.K. bank, and the factoring of receivables by specially
set-up entities (in the course of a securitization) is an increasingly usual and accepted form
of refinancing. Hence, even though the SPV is not covered by banking supervision in its
home country at all, the operability and stability of the Austrian financial market and, in
general, the Austrian economy does not appear to be put at a risk that would reasonably
require the applicability of the Austrian banking laws. Therefore, it follows from a teleo-
logical interpretation that BWG Section 4(1), in connection with Section l(l)(16), does
not cover the SPV's factoring activity in the case at hand. The SPV, hence, is not required
to apply and qualify for an Austrian banking license.
G. LEGAL CERTAINTY
The comparative balancing approach, as outlined and illustrated above, does not provide
a clear-cut rule. It is geared to a general guideline that allows for the consideration of
numerous factors of the case at issue. One might argue that this flexibility of the proposed
approach would jeopardize the predictability of regulatory decisions and, thereby, would
conflict with the principle of legal certainty, which is, at least implicitly, laid down in
most countries' constitutions and, hence, has to be considered when ambiguous provi-
sions are interpreted. It might be true that the outcome of an application of the proposed
comparative balancing approach is not as predictable as a decision based upon a rigid,
inflexible approach pursuant to which domestic banking law is always and only applicable
when the offer or acceptance to enter into a banking contract is declared while being on
domestic soil.100
But by no means does this suggest repudiation of an interpretative approach that
promises to accommodate the legislative purposes much better than any rigid clear-cut
rule. Furthermore, in the legal field under consideration, legal certainty can be easily
established even when a comparative balancing approach is applied. By issuing ex-ante
assessments regarding concrete business activities planned by market participants, the rel-
evant domestic banking regulator can create legal predictability regardless of the inter-
pretative method the regulator applies. Banking authorities in many countries'' already
engage in the issuance of statements in which they inform a potential provider of banking
services whether they would consider the contemplated business activity to be covered by
domestic banking law and, hence, would require the provider to apply and qualify for a
banking license. The obvious benefit, in terms of a considerable increase in legal certainty,
should prompt those banking authorities that do not yet issue ex-ante assessments0 2 to
change their respective practice or, where necessary, to push for an amendment of the
respective legislation.
100. See, e.g., Gapp & Gfall, supra note 15, at 246-47.
101. Compare, for example, the so-called No-Action Letters in the United States or the possibility to apply
a priori for exemption from the applicability of certain provisions of the KWG in Germany (see KWG, supra
note 13, § 2(4)).
102. As, for example, the Austrian FMA.
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V. Conclusions
Cross-border banking activities-banking services that are provided by a foreign bank
into the recipient country without the bank being physically present in the recipient
country-are not explicitly addressed by the banking laws in many countries. Closing
this legislative gap in accordance with the acknowledged standards of legal methodology
requires analysis of the purpose (telos) of the regulatory banking laws and consideration
of the governing fundamental principles of domestic and international law. It has been
demonstrated that, as a general rule, the higher the risk posed by a certain cross-border
banking activity to the operability and stability of the recipient country's financial market,
the more legitimate the extensive interpretation of such country's banking laws to govern
the extraterritorial behavior becomes.
Among the potential links that a cross-border banking activity can have to a certain
country, only two have been identified in the course of a teleological interpretation as
being relevant: (1) the place of the physical presence of the bank and (2) the domicile of
the bank's counterparty. The former creates, beyond doubt, a sufficiently strong territorial
link to the bank's home country to justify the application of that country's banking laws
also to cross-border (and hence partially extraterritorial) transactions. By contrast, the
latter link (the domicile of the counterparty) normally does not extend the reach of the
recipient country's banking laws to cross-border transactions that do not put the bank's
counterparty in a creditor position. The same applies, according to the principle of rea-
sonableness, to the remaining banking activities-those in which the counterparty would
suffer direct losses from the bank's bankruptcy-in cases where the banking supervision
provided by the bank's home country regulator is equivalent to, or stronger than, the po-
tential supervision by the recipient country's bank regulator. Only if this is not the case
can the territorial link to the recipient country, constituted by the counterparty's domicile,
possibly justify the extraterritorial application of the recipient country's banking laws. For
that situation, this article suggests application of a comparative balancing approach that
compares the balanced social costs and benefits of a potential additional oversight by the
recipient country's bank regulator in any given unsolved case, with the respective bal-
anced costs and benefits of such additional regulation in the solved cases of in-country
international banking business (conducted, in particular, through representative offices).
As a general guideline, the smaller (i) the scope and size of the foreign bank's cross-border
business in the recipient country, (ii) the differences between banking and corporate laws
and enforcement between home country and recipient country, (iii) the actual default risk
of the bank in light of mandatory and voluntary safety nets, and (iv) the unusualness of the
provided cross-border banking services, the more restrictively the extraterritorial applicabil-
ity of the recipient country's banking laws should be interpreted.
The potentially lower predictability of agency decisions that are based on a flexible
balancing approach, as opposed to a rigid, inflexible clear-cut rule, can be easily avoided
by banking authorities issuing ex-ante assessments regarding specific business activities
contemplated by market participants.
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